The same standard economic theory that generates bunching at the (convex) kink as individuals enter the gap, should also generate "missing mass" at the concave kink created by the sharp price decreases when individuals hit the deductible amount or hit the catastrophic coverage limit (see Figure I ). It is di¢ cult to analyze the distribution of spending around the catastrophic limit. 1 Appendix Figure A3 , however, shows no evidence of such missing mass around the deductible level for individuals in plans with the standard deductibles. We exclude from the analysis the roughly 10% of people in plans with a (non-zero) deductible that is not the standard deductible level. As with the location of the kink, the level of the deductible is set di¤erently each year in the standard bene…t. It is $265 in 2007 It is $265 in , $275 in 2008 It is $265 in , and $295 in 2009 This …nding of excess mass (bunching), but not missing mass, is mirrored in the labor supply context where previous research has similarly found excess mass in annual earnings in convex kinks but not missing mass at concave kinks (Saez 2010). One potential rationale for the bunching at the gap but the lack of "missing mass" at the deductible amount might be that it is easier to stop (or delay) utilization in response to an increase in price at the gap than it is to increase (or speed up) utilization because of an anticipated decrease in price if one were to hit the deductible level. It would be interesting to see if this lack of missing mass at non-convex kinks is a broader phenomenon, and if so to understand why. In the context of health insurance, typical contracts specify a price that is decreasing in total spending, so that most of the generated kinks are nonconvex. Some health insurance contracts, however, have convex kinks, such as high-deductible Health Reimbursement Accounts, where the price the consumer faces increases discontinuously when the employer contribution to help cover the deductible is exhausted (Lo Sasso et al. 2010) . 1 Analysis of the spending distribution around the catastrophic limit is noisy for two reasons. First, only few people spend enough to put them in the range of the catastrophic limit, so sample sizes are small. Second, the catastrophic limit is a function of out-of-pocket spending, not total spending. However, the distribution of out-ofpocket spending changes mechanically when cost-sharing changes. We therefore would need to analyze the distribution of total spending around the catastrophic limit, but the mapping (from out-of-pocket spending to its associated total spending) introduces additional noise. Therefore, although we …nd no evidence of missing mass at the catastrophic limit, given these data issues we do not consider the result particularly informative.
B. Estimation details
Simulation We estimate our model using simulated minimum distance. As described in Section
To calculate m s (') we simulate data given a vector of parameters. To do so, we …rst calculate the value function for each latent type and plan combination as described below. For each observation we then simulate S claim histories. Given a person's chosen plan, age, and other characteristics we simulate a sequence of claims. We …rst draw the person's type m is from a multinomial distribution with probabilities exp(z i m )= P M k=1 exp(z i k ) . Then, starting from the …rst week of the year (t = 51) and going until the …nal week of the year (t = 0), we simulate a claim history. 2 Cumulative spending begins with x is;51 = 0. The initial health state, ist , is drawn from its type speci…c stationary distribution. Each week there is an event with probability ist . When there is an event, the log potential claim is log ist N ( m is ; 2 m is ). The utility cost of not …lling the claim is ! ist , which is equal to ist with probability 1 p m is and uniform on (0; ist ) with probability p m is . The claim is …lled if
In this case,
We repeat this simulation until t = 0. We then use the simulated data to calculate the statistics described in Section IV.D. Since the number of observations is large, we use one simulation per observation (S = 1).
Minimization Throughout the minimization of the objective function, the underlying random draws are kept constant and only shifted and/or rescaled as the parameters change. Nonetheless, the simulated objective is not continuous with respect to ' due to discrete changes in whether some simulated potential claims are …lled or not. The large number of potential sequences of claims makes smoothing the objective function di¢ cult. Instead, we use a minimization algorithm that is robust to poorly behaved objectives, the covariance matrix adaptation evolution strategy (CMA-ES) of Hansen (2006) . Like simulated annealing and various genetic algorithms, CMA-ES incorporates randomization, which makes it e¤ective for global minimization. Like quasi-Newton methods, CMA-ES also builds a second order approximation to the objective function, which makes CMA-ES much more e¢ cient than purely random or pattern based minimization algorithms. In comparisons of optimization algorithms, CMA-ES is among the most e¤ective existing algorithms, especially for non-convex non-smooth objective functions (Hansen et al. 2010; Rios and Sahinidis 2013) . Andreasen (2010) shows that CMA-ES performs well for maximum likelihood estimation of DSGE models. As discussed by Hansen and Kern (2004) , an important parameter for the global convergence of CMA-ES is the population size. We initially set the population size to the default value of 15 (which is proportional to the logarithm of the dimension of the parameters), and then increased it to 100. The computation is primarily CPU bound. The estimation takes roughly four days to run on a server with two Intel Xeon E5-2670 eight-core processors.
Calculation of value function Each individual's value function depends on her chosen plan, j, and her unobserved type, m. As in equation (2) in the main text, the Bellman equation is
where the subscripts denote plan j and type m. The expectation is subscripted by m to emphasize that it depends on the type-speci…c distribution of , !, and 0 . Given that v jm (x; 0; ) = 0, we can compute an approximation to v jm sequentially. First, we approximate v jm (x; 1; ). Then, we use that approximation to compute v jm (x; 2; ), and so on. To be more speci…c, let fx k;j g K k=1 be a large set of values of x that cover the support of x. Then, given some approximation to v jm (x; t 1; ), sayṽ jm (x; t 1; ), we compute
We then calculateṽ jm (x; t; ) using linear interpolation between the f(x k;j ; v k;jm )g values. 3 We allow x k;j to di¤er for each plan. For each plan, x k;j is set to 20 evenly spaced points between 0 and the deductible amount, 20 evenly spaced points between the deductible amount and the kink location, 20 evenly spaced points in the gap, and only 2 points above the catastrophic limit. Thus, plans with a deductible use K = 62 interpolation points and plans without a deductible use K = 42 interpolation points. Above the catastrophic limit, c( ; x) = C for some constant C, so the value function is constant and two interpolation points su¢ ce. To calculate v k;jm , we must integrate over , !, and 0 . 0 is discrete, so integrating over its distribution is straightforward. For and !, we must compute
We approximate the expectation over using Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 30 integration points. Given the assumed distribution of != , the remaining conditional expectation over ! given has a closed form. In particular,
Code The estimation code is written in C++. It is available at https://bitbucket.org/paulschrimpf/medicared/ overview. It uses the covariance matrix adaptation evolution strategy (CMA-ES) of Hansen and Kern (2004) and Hansen (2006) to minimize the objective function. ALGLIB (www.alglib.net) is used for random number generation, interpolation, and integration.
C. More details about model extensions
In the main text we report results from various variants and extensions to the baseline model. Some of the variations, like changing the number of types, are mechanical. Others require some explanation. This section describes the two less trivial variations of the model, and how the value function computation is altered for each.
C.1. Allowing for risk aversion
As stated in the main text, we introduce constant absolute risk aversion while maintaining perfect intertemporal substitution by specifying recursive preferences as in Kreps and Porteus (1978) or Epstein and Zin (1989) . Individual preferences over a stochastic sequence of ‡ow utilities, fu t g, are de…ned recursively as
where is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. Using the form of u t in our model, this becomes
;
where`t = 1 if there was a prescription to potentially …ll and d t = 1 if the prescription was …lled.
The expectation of the maximum is calculated in a similar way as in the risk neutral case.
C.2. Allowing for the delay of purchasing to subsequent year
As described in the main text, we assume that each prescription must be …lled either immediately, at the start of next year, or never. A potential prescription comes with a monetary cost and a utility ‡ow cost of not …lling !. If a potential prescription is not …lled, then each period depreciates at rate h and ! depreciates at rate h . Un…lled prescriptions may be …lled at the start of the next year at a (known) expected price q i . We assume that q i is known and taken as given. To calculate it, we calculate E[pjrisk score; plan] and assume that people use their current year risk score and plan to predict next year's end-of-year price. We compute q i = E[pjrisk score; plan] by dividing risk score into 3 bins (lowest third, middle third, and highest third) and taking the average observed end-of-year price in each plan and bin.
With these assumptions, the dynamic optimization is di¤erent for each plan and risk score bin, so we subscript the value function by i to capture the idea that it varies with q i , which as described varies by plan and risk score tercile. Then, the value functions can be written as 
To calculate the value function we must compute,
dG(!j )dG( ):
We calculate the inner integral analytically using the assumption that ! U (0; 1), and calculate the outer integral using quadrature. The inner integral can be written as
dr:
The values of r where we switch from one of the three terms in the max to another are
If 0 r 1 r 2 r 3 1, then our expression for the inner integral becomes
It will always be true that 0 r 1 1. However, the rest of these inequalities need not hold. If 0 r 2 r 1 r 3 , then the integral is
Other cases are treated similarly. ($2,510) . Frequencies are normalized to sum to 1 across the displayed range. N =12,189. The …gure shows that for individuals in plans with the $2,100 kink location, there is evidence of excess mass around $2,100 but not at the standard kink locations. Naturally, the …gure is somewhat noisier than the baseline analyses that use the considerably larger baseline sample. This prediction forces the predictive line to be monotone in spending, and to asymptote to one as annual spending approach in…nity. The solid ("alternative") line shows how the prediction would change if the restriction is not imposed. It is generated by regressing the share of individuals with purchase in December in each $20 spending bin, using only individuals with annual spending (relative to the kink location) between -$2,000 and -$500, on a quadratic function of the mid-point of the spending amount in the bin, weighting each bin by the number of bene…ciaries in that bin. Online Appendix Table A1 shows how this alternative prediction a¤ects the quantitative results. y + 1 as a function of her total annual spending (relative to the kink location, which is normalized to 0) in the prior year (year y). "Relative" January spending in year y + 1 is de…ned as the ratio of January spending in year y + 1 to average monthly spending in March through June (of year y + 1). Each bar on the graph represents individuals within $50 above the value on the x-axis. The y-axis reports the average, for each year t spending bin, of the "relative January spending"measure. The dashed, horizontal "counterfactual" relative January spending is calculated as the average relative January spending for people -500 to -2000 below the kink in year y: Table replicates Table IV in the main text, but uses a less restrictive way to generate "predicted" probabiltiies.
Additional references mentioned only in the appendix
Online Appendix Figure A5 provides more details about the comparison between the primary and alternative way to construct these predictions. (10) in the main text), with M estimated by the numeric derivative of the objective function. Bottom panels report implied quantities based on these parameters. Note that spending depends on the arrival rate of drug events ( ), the distribution of event size ( ), as well as on the decision to claim, which is a¤ected by the features of the contract and the parameter p.
